Governor: The Republic of High Court Founder
WA Delegate: None.
Founder: The Republic of High Court Founder
Last WA Update:
The High Court contains 2 nations.
Today's World Census Report
The Largest Insurance Industry in The High Court
The World Census posed as door-to-door salespeople in order to establish which nations have the most extensive Insurance industries.
As a region, The High Court is ranked 16,190th in the world for Largest Insurance Industry.
|1.||The United Socialist States of Justice Dendrobium||Psychotic Dictatorship||“That sh*t look like the Battle Pass”|
|2.||The Republic of High Court Founder||Democratic Socialists||“God, Homeland, Liberty”|
- : The Dictatorship of Russian Red Soviets of the region MineKhan Origin Nations proposed constructing embassies.
- : Justice sunipi departed this region for Thaecia.
- : Justice sunipi resigned as Chief Justice of The High Court.
- : Justice sunipi updated the World Factbook entry.
- : The Republic of My conpuder of the region Lardyland proposed constructing embassies.
- : Justice andusre ceased to exist.
- : Justice sunipi removed a dispatch.
- : Justice sunipi added a dispatch.
- : The Fabricated Reality of North Truman of the region Truman proposed constructing embassies.
- : The Republic of High Court Founder appointed The United Socialist States of Justice Dendrobium as Associate Justice with authority over Communications in The High Court.
The High Court Regional Message Board
The Ambis has asked the Court whether an outgoing World Assembly Delegate, who has resigned as per the relevant procedures, can cast the region's World Assembly vote in the absence of an incoming World-Assembly Delegate.
LR 042, Delegacy Transition Act, Article 2(1) states " the incumbent WAD is legally required to cast their vote in line with the recommendations of the WAD-elect", leaving no room for any situation in which the incumbent WAD could vote differently from the directive of a WAD-Elect. The Court holds that once the incumbent WAD has resigned from their position [as elected WAD], the incumbent WAD has legally renounced all the powers associated with the office, including that of deciding the region's vote. Otherwise allowing the incumbent WAD to cast a vote without the directive of an incoming WAD or WAD-elect would be equal to reinstating them to their former position--which is inconsistent with the Constitution's strong implication that the powers of the WAD should be held by an elected WAD. The lack of an incoming WAD / WAD-elect does not change the incumbent WAD powers but instead prevents them from carrying any voting directive for there is no one to give it.
The Court recognizes that this leads to an impractical situation where the region would be left without its voting power for an undetermined period. The solution thus lies in Congress' hands if they do not want for such a situation to happen again.
In short, the Court holds that the incumbent World Assembly Delegate, as defined in LR 042 Delegacy Transition Act, cannot cast the region's vote in the World Assembly in the event that the line of succession to the World Assembly Delegate has been exhausted and there is no World Assembly Delegate-elect.
Chief Justice The Islamic Country of Honour
Associate Justice Islonia
Associate Justice Dendrobium
Are you seeking (check one):
- a Court order declaring an item or government action, to the point of the inconsistency, unconstitutional;
- a Court declaration on the correct interpretation of the Constitution; ✅
Describe the relevant facts as you hold them to be:
III.III.I states: « The Prime Minister shall have the powers to sign or veto laws passed by Congress ».
I.II states: « Section II - Amendments to this Constitution may only be passed with a 2/3rds majority in each Chamber of Congress and the approval of the citizenry with a 3/5ths majority vote in a referendum. »
My question is: can the Prime Minister veto a Constitutional amendment by itself? Additionally, if a bill partially contains a Constitutional amendment (part of it is legislative resolution; part of it is an amendment to the constitution) and the Prime Minister issues a veto, is the entire bill vetoed including the amendment, or is only the legislative resolution vetoed but the Constitutional amendment progresses? Furthermore, when such a bill is passed, if it attains a simple majority (i.e 6/11) but not a two thirds majority (i.e. 8/11), does the legislative section of the bill progress but the constitutional amendment is removed?
The filing has been accepted by the High Court of Thaecia. The statement phase begins now.
Both the filing party and the Government are invited to make their opening statements.
Justices, I apologise for no statement in 2 weeks- I know I am the one constantly sounding the slow court trumpet but this time it was me: the delay was caused by my wish to have a LAM confirmed first before we go through with this. Now I have been confirmed as LAM I will be giving my statement by Monday on behalf of myself and the government.
Have to apologise for the delay again, simply just forgot- human error
Your honours, I will approach the problems that I have raised one at a time.
First of all: Can the Prime Minister veto a Constitutional amendment by itself?
My answer to this is a simple 'No', for the Constitution states that amendments "may only be passed with a 2/3rds majority in each Chamber of Congress and the approval of the citizenry with a 3/5ths majority vote in a referendum". There is no mention of the Prime Minister, whereas the passage of law does explicitly state "in order for a bill to become law, it needs to have passed each chamber with a simple majority vote and attain the signature of the Prime Minister." Thus, a bill which has the only function of amending the Constitution cannot be vetoed by the Prime Minister. There is a clear distinction here and thus while regular laws can be vetoed, amendments cannot.
Secondly: If a bill partially contains a Constitutional amendment (part of it is legislative resolution; part of it is an amendment to the constitution) and the Prime Minister issues a veto, is the entire bill vetoed including the amendment, or is only the legislative resolution vetoed but the Constitutional amendment progresses?
First we must consider this problem with the mind that a Constitutional amendment has a distinct process from legislation and thus cannot be vetoed whereas legislation can be. Now with that in mind, if the Prime Minister vetoes a passed bill that contains both legislation and amendment, we first must discard the idea of a 'bill' as a precursor to an 'act'. While LR 039 does explicitly state that bills are defined as "legislation that has not yet been passed through Congress", there is no good synonym for a piece of text passed by Congress. I further recognise IV.IV states 'in order for a bill to become law'- but what I am discussing is just text. 'So when we discuss bill here, we are discussing it as separate to LR 039 and meaning only text that is passed by Congress.
Thus this hypothetical bill of which Congress has passed many contains both an 'act' and a 'constitutional amendment': These are distinct processes. Congress passes the act via its procedures as per IV.IV and passes the amendment as per I.II; While they are performed at the same time, they are separate, much like how cores in computers perform separate processes on the same computer at the same time distinct from each other. As such, if the PM issues a veto, only the legislation is vetoed, but the Constitutional amendment must persist on to a referendum.
However, what I have truly come to the Court to consider is not a literalist interpretation of text which in my opinion is obvious, but rather one that considers the situation as well. For what if a Constitutional amendment logically requires the contents of the bill? There have been many instances of the Constitution being amended but bills actually effecting those changes. If the legislation can be vetoed but the amendment persists, then the amendment may simply become defunct as well and the Prime Minister has de facto blocked the amendment without actively blocking it. I cannot truly provide an interpretation to this myself for I am not of the Court, but if I had to, it would have to be literalist and simply be that it is an issue for Congress and the PM to resolve between themselves.
Finally: When such a bill is passed, if it attains a simple majority (i.e 6/11) but not a two thirds majority (i.e. 8/11), does the legislative section of the bill progress but the constitutional amendment is removed?
Now my interpretation to this relies on, much like the second, the interpretation that the process between IV.IV and I.II are separate. If the bill attains only a simple majority, then it is passed and the constitutional amendment part must be removed in all manners. This still creates a rather silly situation where there may now be an utterly nonsensical bill, however, this seems like an issue for Congress to resolve with a Constitutional amendment.
Yet if I were a Justice and were actually considering this case, I think I would tend to err on the side of a practical rather than literalist approach to this legislation and interpret my second and third questions as being that the entire bill is vetoed and the entire bill fails. For it would be difficult to legislate on such a topic, and it would be nonsensical/impractical to go with a literalist interpretation of this text. If such an interpretation is taken by the Court, it will open up more problems for Congress and the voters if referendums happen that are nonsensical or laws are passed that are nonsensical without constitutional amendments.
The government motions for an immediate injuctive relief for the Prime Minister Marvinville against the "Recall of Marvinville from the Position of Prime Minister" submitted by Toerana V which has reached the legal requirement of signatures for a recall election to be held. The reasoning for this is that there are too many legal grey areas around the commission of a recall against the Prime Minister that must be resolved in Court before the commencement of a recall election. These areas must be resolved by the Court through a constitutional review before any recall election can be reasonably held.
To summarise briefly, the Constitution states on the recall of an individual "the officeholder shall be removed from office immediately and if applicable a snap election shall occur." should the initial recall vote be successful. First the Court must clarify what the extent of 'if applicable' is in the circumstances of a recall of the Prime Minister. It is clear that the intent of the recall is to initiate a snap election for the post of Prime Minister, but this may be contradictory to the Constitution. This would mean that some of the signatures for the recall may have been made under the potentially false pretences (although not knowingly) of an election being immediately scheduled, which would be clearly contradictory to a democratic society in which a recall election is held under misguided principles.
Additionally, the statement of 'if applicable' also causes confusion when it is considered that the Prime Minister was elected on a ticket. Would the removal of the Prime Minister then not also automatically cause the removal of the Deputy Prime Minister Rayekka? They may be specified as different positions in Article VI Section I of the Constitution, but the concurrent election of both positions mean it is a question that should be immediately considered by the Court before a recall election can even be attempted.
Additionally, the Deputy Prime Minister's potential succession raises other questions that should be addressed in a legal review. If the removal of Marvinville would mean the accession of Rayekka to the PM office, this would create a clear contradiction with the Positions Restrictions Reform Act which states that the World Assembly Delegate cannot be the Prime Minister. This would also not be protected by the Designated Survivor Act which creates procedures for succession only if "the offices of Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister are vacant"; Thus the succession of the WAD DPM would not be protected by LR 045 and it could cause a further problem where yet another WAD election is needed or even another succession crisis like there was upon the resignation of The Ambis as WAD to force an election.
This would collapse the entire government as it would arguably require Ministers to resign from Prime Minister, however another interpretation of the Designated Survivor Act suggests that the resignation of, for instance, the FAM, would not mean the DAM is automatically next, rather the law should be checked again, and the conditions that the line of succession goes FAM first as the PM and DPM are vacant, would still be met, and the FAM would retain their role as Prime Minister and force Thaecia into an infinite loop. This absolutely cannot be reasonably justified in a democratic society and would be a clear violation of the Prime Minister's rights and any of his successor's rights as citizens to due process and fair treatment: to allow this recall to occur without these issues being resolved would unfairly treat the entire region and cause serious damage to the region's democracy and health in an already tense time; a government collapse cannot be dealt with by Thaecia at this time.
Thaecians must know for us to call Thaecia democratic what actually occurs in the recall process. It is the Court's duty as defenders of Thaecian law to uphold our democracy, and by forcing any recall process to be delayed until the conclusion of an immediately pending case on this constitutional crisis, Thaecian regional democracy would be saved from this impending crisis. The Court has set a precedent for stopping procedures for cases before, like criminal trials that were paused or otherwise declined to answer legal reviews. This precedent must be carried over to the recall petition for the health of Thaecian democracy. There is simply absolutely no way this recall can be held without these questions being answered first: we must have these answered before anything can be done.
The injuctive relief has been granted. The recall vote is to be held only after a ruling has been reached on the questions asked by Brototh.
The constitutional reviews will be submitted within the coming period
After discussion with the Chief Justice we have agreed for me to submit my reviews after the conclusion of his examination period so on the 25/26 May