When the World Assembly legislates on how a member nation ought to run its elections, it implicitly creates disincentives to endogenous political reform. Quite simply, authoritarian states are less likely to engage in democratisation if it would entail handing over all power immediately. This is why historically, the development of democratic government has entailed a series of moving compromises which over time lead to equal universal suffrage. Eg French voting during the Bourbon restoration and Orléaniste periods, which was weighted in favour of the wealthy.

Insofar as the World Assembly cannot simply mandate equal universal suffrage in member nations due to the Assembly's Ideological ban rule, it should do as little as possible to stymie endogenous political change. However, certain regulations are necessary to prevent such change from entering long term sub-optimal political equilbria. Consider a society which only allows those without debt to vote: it would create an immovable (but fictitious) electoral majority heavily weighted in favour of wealthy creditors which could only be displaced by civil war. The Assembly has universal interests in preventing the emergence of dead-end political structures which are incapable of non-violent internal reform.

The regulations on 'remote election administration' do not meet this standard. Nor does it accommodate the plethora of possible electoral structures (especially direct deliberative democracies) effectively. The Office therefore recommends a vote against the proposal.

Primary author(s): Imperium Anglorum.