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Aerospace Defence Organisation: WARD [DEFUNCT | SEE IIWIKI]

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WARD



WARD Emblem


Type: Aerospace Warning and Defence

Members


History

Predecessor: CIMCI 1964

(Canastota-Intreimor Missile
Countermeasure Initiative)

Establishment: January 4th, 1985

Years Active: 1986-Present


Unit Information

Number of Personnel:
Classified

Sites:

  • JFS K.L Aark

  • USPAF Skatval

    Role(s):

    • Air Warning (missiles/aircraft)

    • Air Tracking

    • Defensive Missile Launch

    • Aerospace Coordination

Western Argis Aerospace Defence Command


Western Argis Aerospace Defence Command (WARD), is a combined organisation of the United States of Prymont and the Republic of Iverica that provides aerospace warning, air sovereignty, and protection for Western Argis. It is responsible for the operation of one of the largest networks of Integrated Air Defence Systems on Eurth, with early warning and tracking stations in Alharu, Marenesia, and Thalassa aside from its core in Argis. WARD Headquarters are located in two separate commands (one for either member) JFS Narva in Narva, Iverica and USPAF Skatval, Skatval. The WARD co-commanders are, respectively, Air Chief Marshal Harald Aakre of the USPAF and General de Aire Hermann Callisto of the Iverican FLAIR.

History and Formation


Argic War

During the Second Argic War of 1968, belligerent nations such as the Germanic Staat and The hellenic rus employed a growing arsenal of early missiles. Fearing the capability of these semi-guided, short-ranged weapons to strike home territories, threat analyses from the Coalition nations of Iverica and Prymontian predecessor state Ostport concluded that conventional aircraft interception and ground flak emplacements employed at that time for anti-missile countermeasures would be ineffective in the wake of further developing high-yield, guided missiles capable of reaching targets more than 5,000 kilometres away.

From experience in the First Argic War of 1949, analysts from both the Ostport Air Force and Iverican Fuersas L'Aire began funding several alternatives to anti-missile systems in February of 1964. By the time war broke out in 1968, a clear solution was visible on the horizon. Out of all the redundant projects funded by the programme, known as the Canastota-Intreimor Missile Countermeasure Initiative (CIMCI), only one achieved a theoretical success assessment value over 60%. This project was called The "Interceptor Missile" and was spearheaded by a team of three scientists, Oscar H. Andersson, Marco M. Cincinato, Hugo A. Leif.

Testing of the Interceptor Missiles began in August of 1969, early tests showing an initial success rate of 68%. By 1971, the Central Argic Powers had finished development and had begun to deploy the first Ballistic Missiles capable of reaching Canastota and Porto L'Norte with devastating effect on targets both military and civilian. In response to this, CIMCI was ordered to deploy all available prototypes along Iverican and Ostport borders, achieving an initial success rate of 51%, shooting down about 6 of every 10 missiles launched in 1971. Adjusting their designs to cope with the unforeseen battlefield and wartime conditions, the Interceptor team boosted this success rate to tremendous effect in 1972, achieving a kill rate of 77% and 90% in 1973.

By the time the Argic War ended in 1974, the Central Argic Alliance had launched over 162 missiles, 99 of which were fired at civilian targets. Out of this total, the Interceptors had defeated 116 at safe altitudes and distances. Due to this clear success, CIMCI was granted further funding, preempting the advancement of anti-missile systems in the case of potential future missile attacks.

ANCILE Joint Development

The Interceptor's initial success received great attention from the Prymontian and Iverican higher echelons. in 1975, funding was granted for the Interceptor's successor, dubbed the "ANCILE" Missile and Air Raid Defence System. ANCILE was named for both the first two letters of the founding scientist's surnames and also for the mythical shield "Ancile", of the Aroman god Mars. Compared to the Interceptors, ANCILE units were to be capable of high-atmosphere, anti-satellite, and anti-aircraft action, drastically expanding the capability and reach of CIMCI.

Development was slow, and extremely expensive, costing a grand total of $15 Billion Standard Units for research, development, and integration. Over the next decade, five units would be created, fulfilling defence for all theatres of aerial warfare. The completion of the first ANCILE units signalled the CIMCI's transition into a new agency, WARD.

Establishment

In January 4th, 1985, Prymontian and Iverican leaders signed an agreement establishing the "Western Argis Aerospace Defence Command", or WARD, as a bi-lateral cooperative military unit with the express goal of safeguarding both nations' airspace against a potential attack from any direction.

By 1986, the first facilities in both nations were designated and armed with the first three tiers of ANCILE. These facilities were then tested against Variotan Ballistic Missiles provided by Varinco with astounding success (Though Varinco would later develop better units based on the data gathered from the tests). At the end of the decade, offshore and covert WARD facilities had already gained approval from higher command, cementing WARD as both nations' premier air-watch, air-tracking, and air-defence unit.



Germanic SRBMs in the Mediargic

Mediargic Missile Crisis
As written by Prymont

In late 1996, an anonymous Ahranaian millionaire hired a St Francoisburgian private military company to carry out undercover operations within The Hellenic Rus. It is believed that these missions were an attempt to unsettle the political situation within The Hellenic Rus at the time, allowing Ahrana to broaden its reach over the Canamo region. Several politicians were ruthlessly murdered in broad daylight on December 22nd when the PMC lost contact with its commanding officers, resulting in an unnecessary massacre. Public outcry throughout the country caused disruption over the following days by riots, demonstrations, and boycotts. Hellenic Russian politicians realised that they had to act to resolve the matter.

It was discovered that the PMC originated from within St Francoisburg, and immediately it was decided by government to aim their missiles towards the western Argic coast. Since the second Argic War, The Hellenic Rus had been working with the Germanic Staat to develop nuclear warheads, although their projects were outdated and weak due to their lack of resources and poor economies. Inevitably, Iverica was outraged by the potential of nuclear missiles being dropped near their coastline, and threatened preventative measures with WARD. Attention quickly turned to the newly formed United States of Prymont, who had been renovating their WARD systems under government pressure to ensure that the country was protected by modern means. This left the United States incredibly vulnerable. Aerial reconnaissance imagery showed increased activity in eastern Hellenic Russian military ports, indicating that Prymont were also to be targeted.
Fearing a third Argic War, leaders from St Francoisburg, Iverica, Germanic Staat, The Hellenic Rus and the United States of Prymont met in New Halsham to discuss and hopefully quell the matter. Investigations showed that the PMC purchase came from within Ahrana, who were absent at the meeting, resulting in The Hellenic Rus now focusing their attention southwards. With military support from the Germanic Staat, the threat was taken very seriously, and Iverica and the United States worked closely together to prepare their defense. Manufacturing plants in Iverica were sent into overdrive to prepare the United States' WARD updates ahead of schedule, which were eventually delivered in March 1997. This gave the United States the upper hand in the region, forcing The Hellenic Rus to drop their threats.

A later meeting between the United States and The Hellenic Rus led to the latter agreeing to strict nuclear sanctions, including the abandonment of their nuclear warhead project and forced trade deals with Prymont and Iverica to make their economy dependent on those they'd previously targeted. Fortunately, the sanctions placed on The Hellenic Rus led to no further problems from the country until two decades later with the rise of the Circle of Death terrorist group. The Germanic Staat also folded after time, as they were unable to recover from the second Argic War and their loss of Hellenic Russian imports which were redirected to WARD members.

21st Century

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Organisation


Command

WARD operates two main branches, the Southern Command, and the Northern Command. The Southern Command is based in Narva, Iverica; its counterpart, in Skatval, Prymont. Each command respectively is responsible for the gathering of data and initial snap decision making. Commanding officers of both branches are free to make intercept and destroy orders within their own hemispheres without consultation with the other if analytics determines the target to be passing through, or headed towards sovereign airspace.

Commanders of either branch are appointed by the process mandated by respective governments. If needed, both will confer over a hotline to mobilise both Command's assets.

Operating Procedure

WARD operates in two states, active and passive. On passive state, WARD maintains aerospace vigilance, monitoring and adjusting its network's visibility and range to changing factors in weather, alertness, or other intelligence. Once a threat has been detected, typically via infrared satellite detecting a missile launch, WARD transitions into the active state. In this state, focus changes from passive monitoring and adjustment to tracking, parsing, guidance, and launching of the ANCILE systems. Procedure during such as event typically follows three phases: Detection, Analysis, and Intercept.

In the Detection Phase, WARD will be alerted to a threat by a network of offshore Over-The-Horizon Radar equipment or communicate with long-range naval patrols and aerial early warning flights via satellite telemetry detecting aerial objects in a circumferential coverage around the North Oriental Ocean, the Argic Ocean, and the Mediargic areas. Typically, WARD OTH networks detection range factors in at 3,500 km from the peripheral stations, this is bolstered at passing intervals by long-range naval patrols, aerial patrols, or passage of opportunity by units of both the United States of Prymont Navy and the Armada Iverica. In this state, WARD employs aerial, ground-based, and ship-based long-range radar systems to continue track of the threat. It is also supplemented by sonar systems on regular submarine patrols. On average, the smallest manned ANCILE stations can guarantee the tracking of up to 100 separate aerospace objects.

After detection of a foreign aerial object, the information is relayed in a matter of seconds to the nearest missile site and the Analysis Phase begins. In this phase, WARD utilises its classified algorithms to compare data from the ping and alert the all missile sites within a region of opportunity, calculating when minute changes in course, weather, or station response are detected in order to alert and suggest a launch order from the missile site most likely to deliver the quickest, most effective intercept. The WARD algorithm also uses stored profiles in order to identify the aerial object from sets of previously encountered or inputted statistics such as speed, mass, radar signature, thermal signature (when available), flight pattern, and acoustic signature profiles (when available). This information is typically factored within the first few seconds of foreign object detection and is likely to become more accurate over time as the object comes within range of more sophisticated sensors. This phase varies in duration from shortest to longest given external factors supplementing or preventing effective data gathering, one of the most critical being the human decision element of this process. WARD is required to seek human confirmation before committing to the next phase.

In the Interception Phase, a WARD authority issues a directive to launch the appropriate measure after noting the recommendation of the network's analysis. Missiles within sovereign territory, and without (Naval formations or aircraft outside of usual space) will be ordered with supreme authority to divert from any prior engagement and launch any of the five missile measures available to them. The ANCILE missile is guided by satellite, ground, sea, and aerial sensors that may be in the flight path from launch to target intercept. This active tracking is in place for the guidance of singular or multiple ANCILE missiles launched at any set of targets. The quantity of which the network can track accurately depends on the depth of penetration within the WARD circumference. Additionally, the coordination between the missile's own onboard sensors and various ground or sea-based stations enables it to actively adjust its vectors in the case that the target is moving evasively or is utilising electronic countermeasures. The most crucial stage of the Intercept Phase comes when the network determines a guaranteed intercept and kill, or a miss and failure. At this stage, the human element must make a decision to abort succeeding salvos, that will fire automatically until a kill is registered, or to stand by and allow the automated system to pursue its routine.

All WARD procedure is considered with the possibility of a large-scale suppression of air defence scenario. WARD's integrated air defence functions effectively even after the loss of multiple stations. As all station's coverage overlap, awareness of their counterpart's ongoing communication and radar activity mean that WARD's algorithm compensates and learns from loss patterns and contributes to its analysis of threat anticipation, direction, and intensity. A simultaneous strike on WARD facilities is anticipated by a reserve of aerial early warning systems or marine systems that can be deployed quickly to cover blind spots.

In all simulations and wargame scenarios carried out so far against missiles of comparable sophistication, the findings of the research stated that sans direct sabotage and tampering, only depletion of munitions or human refusal would lead to the system's failure to intercept and kill.

Areas of Responsbility

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Towed ANCILE 2 System

Facilities and Equipment


Bases and Sites

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The number and location of most WARD manned stations and missile sites is classified. Though it is estimated to have some 20 stations in the Iverican peninsula alone.

WARD relies on a mix of mobile missile sites composed of wheeled systems and sea stations to lessen its dependence on hardened facilities.

Sea Stations are composed of small sensor buoys, ships grounded in blue-water zones, and submarine sonar devices. The larger stations are mostly ships grounded or beached on shoals and sandbars. They host a variety of jamming equipment, sensors (radar, infrared, acoustic, sonar), and missiles to act as WARD's first line of defence.

Equipment

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Tiered Defence Levels

Tier

Missile System

Threat

Description

SHIELD 1

ANCILE 1

ICBM (range +5,500 km)

Interception at higher atmosphere.
Capable of interception near exo-atmospheric regions.
May be launched from sea-based platforms

SHIELD 2

ANCILE 2

IRBM/LRBM (range 3,000-5,500 km)

Interception at mid-high endo-atmospheric regions.

SHIELD 3

ANCILE 3

SRBM (1,000-3,000 km)

Short-range defence option
also capable of countering sea-skimming and low-altitude threats.

SHIELD 4

ANCILE 4

Aircraft (raids and intruders)

Multiple Launch Missile System
configurable to counter mass raids or solitary targets.

SHIELD 5

ANCILE 5

Rogue/Malicious Satellites

Aircraft-launched measure to
counter targets in Low Earth Orbit.



WARD missile simulation

ANCILE System


The ANCILE Missile and Air Raid Defence System is a jointly-developed missile program created by both agencies from the Republic of Iverica and the United States of Prymont. It was developed to provide a five-tier missile system defence system for short, long, and top atmospheric interception of SRBMs, LRBMs, satellites, aircraft raids and incursions. It is part of the WARD Mutual Missile Defence Initiative.

Most systems of the program are anti-ballistic, anti-aircraft, and anti-satellite defensive systems designed to shoot down short, medium, intermediate, and long-range ballistic missiles. However, the majority of ANCILE units are designed to intercept ballistic missiles and specifically in their terminal phase (descent or reentry) by intercepting with a hit-to-kill approach. Other systems such as the Ancille 4 and Ancille 5 are designed to counter mass aircraft raids and malicious satellites respectively.

The ANCILE interceptors (1-3) do not carry warheads but rely on the kinetic energy of impacts to destroy the incoming missile. ANCILE missiles utilise Mulitple Kill-Vehicle (MKV) technology to fire a screen of kinetic energy impactors at weapon systems carrying decoys or multiple warheads--this technology works in cooperation with high-resolution X-band radars and image recognition software in order to achieve highly-effective guidance. The interceptor's two-stage launch also lends systems like the ANCILE 1 and 2 the ability to be re-tasked or corrected effictely in mid-flight. The kinetic energy hit minimizes the risk of exploding conventional warhead ballistic missiles, and the warhead of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles will not detonate on a kinetic energy hit. Contrastingly, the ANCILE 4 and 5 are equipped with small charge explosives, typical in most surface-to-air AA equivalents.

Doctrine and Practice


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